

## Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 STATE 182120 TOSEC 080067  
ORIGIN PA-02

INFO OCT-01 SS-15 PRS-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 /019 R

DRAFTED BY PA/M: M D ROKEY:MDR

APPROVED BY PA/M: L HYDLE

S/S-O:A.OTTO

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

PA, S/S, S/PRS

-----066531 031852Z /44

O 031803Z AUG 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 182120 TOSEC 080067

FOR CARTER FROM PA

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, OVIP (VANCE)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT EVANS AND NOVAK COLUMN OP-ED PAGE  
WASHINGTON POST WEDNESDAY AUGUST 3 HEADED, "CONCEDING DE-  
FEAT IN EUROPE."

2. PRESIDENT CARTER LATE THIS WEEK WILL BE PRESENTED BY  
HIS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISERS WITH A NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY  
THAT SECRETLY CONCEDES ONE-THIRD OF WEST GERMANY TO A  
SOVIET INVASION RATHER THAN SEEK INCREASED DEFENSE SPEND-  
ING, WHICH THESE ADVISERS SAY WOULD PROVOKE MOSCOW AND  
DIVIDE WASHINGTON.

3. PRM-10, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S TOP-SECRET STRA-  
TEGIC STUDY, SUGGESTED THAT THIS POLICY COULD BE MADE  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 182120 TOSEC 080067

PALATABLE TO WESTERN EUROPE BY SIMPLY NOT ADMITTING ITS  
IMPLICATIONS. THIS COURSE WAS WHOLLY ADOPTED IN HIGH-  
LEVEL MEETINGS JULY 28 AND 29 BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE  
PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. THERE WAS DISSENT  
FROM THE SENIOR OFFICIALS ASSEMBLED.

4. THE STRATEGIC POLICY PAPER TO BE GIVEN THE PRESIDENT

(ABOUT THREE PAGES OF SINGLE-SPACED TYPING) MAKES NO MENTION OF SURRENDER OR DUPLICITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE BUT TALKS OF A COMMITMENT TO A "MINIMUM LOSS OF TERRITORY" IN NATO. TO ACHIEVE A BROADER PERSPECTIVE CARTER OUGHT TO LOOK AT THE MINUTES OF THE JULY 28-29 MEETINGS OF HIS SENIOR COORDINATING COUNCIL (SCC) ON NATIONAL SECURITY.

5. THE SCC AGREED ON A 3 PER CENT ANNUAL INCREASE IN DEFENSE SPENDING, FULFILLING CARTER'S PROMISE TO HIS NATO ALLIES EARLIER THIS YEAR. BUT, ACCORDING TO VERBATIM NOTES TAKEN BY ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS, BRZEZINSKI DECLARED: "IT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT TO GAIN SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR PROCUREMENT OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES REQUIRED TO ASSURE THAT NATO COULD MAINTAIN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IF DETERRENCE FAILS. THEREFORE, WE SHOULD ADOPT A 'STALEMATE' STRATEGY. THAT IS, A STRATEGY OF FALLING BACK AND LEAVING THE SOVIETS TO FACE THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR AGGRESSION."

6. BRZEZINSKI WENT ON TO DECLARE THAT THESE "POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES"--WORLD OPINION, U.N. DISAPPROVAL, U.S. MOBILIZATION--WOULD HELP DETER A SOVIET INVASION. THERE WAS NO DISSENT FROM THOSE PRESENT, INCLUDING VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE, CIA DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER, CHIEF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATOR PAUL WARNKE, DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 182120 TOSEC 080067

CHARLES DUNCAN AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CHAIRMAN GEN. GEORGE BROWN.

7. BRZEZINSKI CONTINUED: "WE AGREE THERE MUST BE A GAP BETWEEN OUR DECLARED STRATEGY AND ACTUAL CAPABILITY. WE CANNOT FOR POLITICAL REASONS ANNOUNCE OUR STRATEGY." AGAIN, THERE WAS NO DISSENT, THOUGH SOME OFFICIALS VOICED THE OPINION THERE WOULD BE HELL TO PAY IF THE GERMANS LEARNED WHAT WAS HAPPENING.

8. ALL THIS FOLLOWS THE SCRIPT OF THE JUNE 20 DRAFT OF PRM-10, WHICH LISTS FOUR OPTIONS FOR LOWER-RANGE DEFENSE SPENDING. EACH WOULD STOP A SOVIET OFFENSIVE AT A LINE FORMED BY THE WESER AND LECH RIVERS, SURRENDERING ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF WEST GERMANY (INCLUDING SAXONY AND MOST OF BAVARIA).

9. THESE FOUR OPTIONS, ACCORDING TO PRM-10, DO NOT "PLAN" TO STOP "A DETERMINED WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL ATTACK . . . IF THE SOVIETS PERSIST IN THEIR ATTACK, A U.S.-NATO CONVENTIONAL DEFEAT IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS LIKELY." YET THESE OPTIONS ARE CERTAINLY NOT REJECTED OUT OF HAND.

10. "MANY OF THE ADVERSE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS" OF THE REDUCED DEFENSE OPTIONS (SUCH AS INDEPENDENT GERMAN RE-ARMAMENT OR, CONVERSELY, EUROPEAN ACCOMMODATION TO MOSCOW) PROBABLY COULD BE AVOIDED IF THE U.S. CONTINUED TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT" PRESENT STRATEGY. ADVERSE REACTIONS BY WESTERN EUROPE "COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY SOFTENED . . . IF THE U.S. WERE TO AVOID ANY STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT A LOSS OF NATO TERRITORY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE."

11. PRM-10 ALSO PROPOSES THESE POLITICAL STEPS, ACCOMPANYING DEFENSE REDUCTION, THAT COULD HELP FORESTALL A RUSSIAN ATTACK: "THE U.S. MIGHT PURSUE ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES MORE VIGOROUSLY TO OBTAIN REDUCTIONS IN UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 182120 TOSEC 080067

THREATS AND OPPOSING FORCE LEVELS, THEREBY MINIMIZING THE RISKS OF UNILATERAL U.S. REDUCTIONS. WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE U.S. MIGHT UNDERTAKE A BROAD PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE USSR ON TRADE, CREDITS, FOOD, AND TECHNOLOGY, THEREBY LOWERING POLITICAL TENSIONS AND REDUCING THE RISKS OF WAR."

12. THE FOUR OPTIONS CALLING FOR INCREASES IN DEFENSE SPENDING, SAYS PRM-10, WOULD BE INTENDED TO ROLL BACK A SOVIET INVASION BUT "MAY PROVOKE ADVERSE SOVIET AND ALLIED REACTIONS." THIS "MIGHT PROVOKE A SIMILAR SOVIET COUNTER-BOIL-UP OR EVEN A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK," AND THEREFORE "MIGHT ACTUALLY UNDERMINE DETERRENCE."

13. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE DISTURBED BY "STRATEGIES REQUIRING A VISIBLE AND RAPID INCREASE IN THE SIZE OF U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE. . . . SOVIET SUSPICIONS OF U.S. MOTIVES WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CONCLUDE MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, WITH SALT (STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS) OR MBFR (MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS)."

14. PRM-10 PREDICTS ANY INCREASE IN DEFENSE SPENDING WOULD GENERATE "DIVISIVE DEBATE" AND WARNS AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD HIKE IN DEFENSE CAPABILITY "IS LIKELY TO FIND LITTLE DOMESTIC SUPPORT." IN GENERAL, THE OPTIONS CALLING FOR DECREASED STRENGTH ARE SEEN AS CAUSING LESS TROUBLE; IN PARTICULAR, THE OPTION CALLING FOR APPROXIMATELY THE PRESENT MILITARY LEVEL BUT WITH LESS SUSTAINED POWER IN EUROPE IS DESCRIBED AS "PROBABLY THE MOST ANODYNE (OPTION) IN TERMS OF ITS DOMESTIC IMPACT, UNLESS IT WERE ONLY DESCRIBED AS A LOWERING OF OUR SIGHTS."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 182120 TOSEC 080067

15. THESE VIEWS WERE IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED LAST WEEK BY  
BRZEZINSKI AND THE OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS. SO THE  
PRESIDENT IS ABOUT TO ADOPT A POLICY BOILING DOWN TO  
THIS: INSTEAD OF SEEKING GREATER DEFENSE SPENDING TO  
DEFEND CENTRAL EUROPE, RELY ON POLITICAL PRESSURES TO

DETER MOSCOW WHILE SECRETLY CONCEDED A MILITARY  
DEFEAT. WHETHER THIS REFLECTS A "POLITICAL ENVIRON-  
MENT" AS CLAIMED BY BRZEZINSKI, IT CERTAINLY REVEALS  
THE ENVIRONMENT WITHIN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION.  
END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TOSEC, PRESS COMMENTS, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, MILITARY POLICIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 03-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977STATE182120  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** M D ROKEY:MDR  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D770278-0382  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t197708100/aaaadhgk.tel  
**Line Count:** 187  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** c5b28c4e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ORIGIN PA  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 04-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1400481  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** PRESS MATERIAL  
**TAGS:** OVIP, SOPN, MPOL, US, XG, GE, WASHINGTON POST, (VANCE, CYRUS R)  
**To:** SECRETARY  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/c5b28c4e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009